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Law in a liberal capitalist society is multi-dimensional and multi-purpose. It is 
facilitative, symbolic, constitutive and coercive. There are academic reputations 
to be made in articulating the theory and providing the examples to support these 
sweeping assertions.1 In this short essay, I will look at law’s constitutive power, 
and specifically, at the way in which law, by validating the market as an essential 
decision-maker, impedes a reconceptualization of our approach to resource 
management, and thereby helps perpetuate inappropriate development of the 
Atlantic region’s primary resource industries.
In discussing the market, I want to challenge the conventional wisdom on the 
functions and nature of states and markets as expressed in Volume One of the 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada (The Macdonald Commission). The Report defines states as 
“concentrations of coercive authority backed by force which govern particular 
citizenries within fixed boundaries”; by maintaining law and order, states provide 
“the minimum framework of security for the pursuit of private goals in society and 
economy.” The market, in contrast, “co-ordinates innumerable private economic 
decisions without resort to coercion,” and “allocates resources impersonally to 
their most profitable use in a context of consumer sovereignty.”2
The idea of the market as an arena of private autonomy is central to liberal 
legal ideology. We are used to thinking about our personal lives as more or less 
private and everything else as public,3 but in traditional legal theory, the line 
between private and public demarcates the areas in which individuals are free to 
create their own rights and obligations through the exercise of their freedom of 
contract from those areas where rights and obligations are defined by the state. 
Thus, contract, tort and property are considered to be private law, allowing
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individuals to regulate their relations with each other, in contrast to criminal law, 
in which the state regulates individuals’ relations with each other and with the 
state. But the public/private distinction is socially constructed, not natural or 
inherent. Studies of different times and different cultures reveal the extent to 
which the boundary between public and private is infinitely varied. Critical 
scrutiny of legal doctrine, moreover, reveals that the distinction is so manipulable 
that it is logically incoherent.4 For example, in creating jobs for communities, 
governments and courts invoke the public character of large private enterprise to 
justify extensive subsidies and special protection from private tort actions for 
injunctions to prevent industrial pollution.5 Yet governments and courts refuse 
to intervene when these same enterprises close down their operations, destroying 
the communities which have sustained them. That decision is characterized as a 
private decision, beyond the reach of law.6
At their simplest, markets permit people to exchange things, now or in the 
future. Markets in illegal commodities or services operate outside the legal regime 
which defines and protects the rights of property owners, but even these markets 
are not private markets, since participants in them are subject to criminal sanctions 
for their activity. Markets in legal commodities are even less private, since they 
exist only because the law will enforce any agreements that the participants make 
with respect to resources, tangible or intangible, in which the law permits them to 
claim a property right. Markets work because law supports the assumptions on 
which they work. Yet these assumptions — that some resources can and should be 
“propertised”7 and that allowing individuals to buy and sell these resources in the 
market will secure maximum individual freedom and fulfilment and, incidentally, 
the good of society — are increasingly untenable in the real world of the 1990s. 
Equally untenable is the assumption of the Macdonald Commission that markets 
operate noncoercively, to secure the most profitable use of resources. Economic 
coercion is as real as, and often more powerful than legal sanctions.
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I will use two examples to suggest some of the dimensions of my challenge. 
The first is the government response to the financial collapse in 1982 of Natsea 
and H.B. Nickerson and Sons Ltd., a smaller company which had acquired control 
of Natsea in 1977. In order to reap the anticipated benefits of Canada’s new 200- 
mile offshore limit, Nickerson and Natsea invested heavily, with borrowed money, 
in the latest fishing technology -  deep-sea fishing boats which cost $2 million and 
destroyed the habitat of the fish they were designed to catch. When the 
companies could not pay the bills, the federal and provincial governments provided 
$105 million to restructure Natsea. Private investors, principally the Jodrey and 
Sobey families, put in $20 million, and ended up with control of the company. The 
mainstream regional media, which had conducted an hysterical campaign against 
nationalization of the fishery, whole-heartedly supported this “private-sector 
solution,” especially as it involved regional entrepreneurs. With its near 
monopoly confirmed, Natsea continued to shift resources from the inshore fishery 
to the more capital-intensive deepsea fishery, and the current crisis in the Atlantic 
fishery due to declining fish stocks is one of the consequences. In a market 
economy, in which fish are the property of whoever can catch them, it is 
unprofitable for capitalists to take the long view.8
My second example -  the event that determined the focus of this piece, and 
makes it both a rant and a keening — is the deaths of twenty-six coal miners in 
Pictou County, Nova Scotia, in the Westray mine disaster. Westray, which went 
into production in late 1991, is the most recent attempt to mine the thick, gassy 
and very dangerous coal seams which twist and turn in fantastic convolutions, folds 
and faults deep beneath the surface in Pictou County. The mine is privately 
owned by Curragh Resources Ltd., Toronto, but produces coal for the provincially- 
owned Nova Scotia Power Corporation. Under its fifteen-year contract, the Power 
Corporation must take 700,000 tonnes of coal a year, and pay for an additional 
275,000 tonnes regardless of whether it is needed.
Smoke from coal-burning power plants is a major contributor to acid rain, yet 
requests for an environmental impact assessment hearing before the mine opened 
were brushed aside with glib assurances that Pictou coal was cleaner than coal 
from the federally-owned and state-supported Devco mines in Cape Breton, a 
direct competitor with Westray for the Power Corporation’s business. The 
Westray mine is situated in the riding which gave Prime Minister Mulroney his 
first seat in Parliament. When work began on opening the mine, the riding was 
represented provincially by Conservative Don Cameron, now the Premier. 
Development costs for the mine, which exceeded $140 million, were subsidized by 
the federal and provincial governments. It employed 250.
®For a discussion of these issues, see R  Williams, “The Restructuring That Wasn’t: The Scandal of 
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Persistent questions about safety conditions in the mine were brushed aside, 
even when raised in the provincial Legislative Assembly. The mine is not 
unionized; some unionists suggest that as part of its anti-union efforts, the owners 
hired many workers with limited coal mining experience. Despite the lack of 
alternative employment in the area, miners have quit because they believed that 
the minft was unsafe. Since the mine opened, there have been seven serious roof 
collapses, and repeated high methane readings.
If the market truly allocated resources to the best advantage, there would be 
very little coal mining in Nova Scotia. Given the physical characteristics of Nova 
Scotian mines — the high levels of methane gas in Pictou, the seams that extend 
for miles under the ocean in Cape Breton — there are many other coal deposits 
that can be mined more profitably. The Westray mine would never have opened 
without the inducement of millions in government loans, loan guarantees and 
grants, and a guaranteed market in the Nova Scotia Power Corporation. Yet to 
s im p ly  decry government involvement in the project, and call for a return to free 
markets and private enterprise, is to miss the point. Curragh Resources thought 
it could make a profit from opening Westray. Perhaps it expected its profit from 
an increase in the price of its shares, or from the various untendered contracts it 
could award, rather than from the mine itself. Be that as it may, developing 
natural resources simply by making them available to anyone who sees a chance 
for a profit leads to disasters like Westray.9
Allowing the market to allocate the rewards for resource development 
encourages a slash-and-burn approach. Profitability is measured in the short-term, 
regardless of short or long-term costs that do not show up on the corporate 
balance sheet. Law offers the policy-makers a range of options for encouraging 
a more responsible approach to resource development, but, by maintaining, and 
indeed, partially creating, the perception that there are fundamental differences 
between the state and the market, the public sphere and the private, law helps 
lim it  the kinds of transformations that policy-makers envision, and that the rest of 
us ask for and accept.
9For a discussion of these issues, see H. Glasbeek and E. Tucker, Death by Consensus: The Westray 
Story, Working Paper No. 3 (Centre for Research on Work and Society, York University; 1992).
